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Abstract: This article examines how force majeure has been invoked in international 
investment law as a shield against claims of state responsibility for losses that foreign investors 
sustained in various types of turmoil. The historically rich diplomatic and jurisprudential 
practice has created a misplaced expectation about the potential of this international law 
principle as a defence in the modern investment law context. The article argues that the 
usefulness of the defence depends on the nature of the claim, whereby different categories of 
claims may be susceptible to different concepts of force majeure, distinguishing in particular 
between force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, a circumstance informing 
the duty of due diligence, and an exception in investment contracts. The article examines how 
these concepts overlap and differ, and how the interaction between them affects their 
application as a defence in conflict-related investment arbitration cases. It argues that while the 
potential of force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness is limited, its 
manifestation as an aspect that modifies the obligation of due diligence or an exception 
included in investment contracts, has played an important role in investment cases concerning 
conflict-related losses. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Violent situations like riots, revolutions, civil wars and international armed conflicts can impair 
the state’s ability to carry out its obligations towards foreign investors.1 For example, due to 
the suddenness and impact of a violent event, state organs may be unable to protect investments 
(including the investor as a person, and the investment as facilities, assets, personnel etc.) 
against physical attacks of rebels, terrorists or insurgents. On the other hand, state security 
forces may be compelled to inflict damage on investment property in the course of hostilities 
or in furthering their military cause. Furthermore, during protracted violent periods, 
government agencies may become unable to carry out obligations under investment contracts, 
and fulfilling financial obligations to investors may become temporarily impossible. In the 
absence of armed conflict, such conduct could result in state responsibility to pay damages to 
injured investors for the violation of investment treaties or customary protections. International 
law, however, provides certain rules that address disruptions to a state’s ability to perform and 
provide for a fairer distribution of risk when such disruptions occur. One such rule that has 
been frequently invoked when a conflict situation caused disruption is the defence of force 
majeure.  
The notion of legal excuse for not performing an obligation due to an overpowering, 
supervening event is widely believed to have origins in Roman law.2 Centuries of international 
commerce and legal development contributed to the wide popularity of this principle, which 
has taken different names and different meanings across various municipal legal systems and 
various legal disciplines. The name force majeure originated from the French Civil Code of 
1804, but has become widely used in other domestic, transnational and international legal 
systems as a concept denoting certain extraordinary events that can justify the non-performance 
of a legal obligation.3 Commonly, such events would have to be unforeseen, or foreseen but 
irresistible, uncontrollable and make it impossible to perform an obligation. The ubiquity of 
                                                          
1 For the purpose of this article, the concept of armed conflict transcends the narrow dichotomous definition 
created by the sources of international humanitarian law. Instead, the concept of armed conflict is used 
autonomously as emerged from armed conflict clauses in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) so as to encompass 
different types of violent situations of certain scale (including riots, revolutions etc.). See e.g. Article 5 of the 
Pakistan–Philippines BIT (1999) which states that the clause applies with respect to losses owing to ‘war, 
revolution, state of emergency, revolt, insurrection, riot, or other armed conflicts in the territory of such 
Contracting Party.’ 
2 For example, Justinian’s Digest expresses the idea that nobody is bound by the impossible: ‘impossibilium nulla 
obligatio.’ See Peter Mazzacano, ‘Force Majeure, Impossibility, Frustration & the Like: Excuses for Non-
Performance; the Historical Origins and Development of an Autonomous Commercial Norm in the CISG’, 2 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, 2011, 2: 1–54, at 12. 
3 Ibid, at 39.  
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this exception across various municipal systems paved the way for its gradual acceptance in 
international law as a defence against state responsibility. 
Historically, the notion entered the international legal discourse in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, a period fraught with riots, revolutions and civil wars.4 The claims of 
foreigners who suffered injuries in those situations were espoused by their home states that 
sought compensation for losses incurred via channels of diplomatic protection or different 
types of adjudicative bodies, like mixed claims commissions and arbitrations. Because host 
states commonly invoked force majeure as a defence against such claims, the concept became 
increasingly subjected to the analysis of international arbitrators, diplomats and scholars. It is 
thus no exaggeration to suggest that developments involving losses that foreign investors 
sustained during violent strife importantly contributed to the development of a defence of force 
majeure and its ultimate codification in the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARS).5 
While in the past, the treatment of foreign investors in time of armed conflict gave rise 
to discussions about force majeure, in modern investment law, characterised by international 
investment treaties, until recently, the defence has rarely been invoked, let alone successfully 
asserted, at least as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. Scholars tend to agree this is due 
to a high threshold for meeting the requirements of the said defence in international law.6 The 
reasons may be more complex, however. This article sets out to examine the treatment of force 
majeure as a state’s defence against claims of foreign investors for losses they sustained during 
armed conflicts. It aims to show that the appeal of force majeure as a defence in the 
international law of state responsibility is reduced not only because of strict conditions for its 
invocation, but more importantly, due to the availability of other defences that are more 
relevant and suitable for addressing such supervening situations.7 Critically for this article, 
                                                          
4 See Section 3. The governments of newly independent Latin American countries were unstable, there was a civil 
war in the US, growing nationalist movements in Europe, and a wave of colonisation in Africa. 
5 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
with Commentaries’ UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp 10, Ch 4, (2001) UN Doc A/56/10 (ARS) Article 23. 
6 See e.g. Federica I Paddeu, ‘A Genealogy of Force Majeure in International Law’, British Yearbook of 
International Law, 2012, 82(1): 381–494; Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and 
Force Majeure’ in Peter Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investmentl Law (OUP 
2008) 499; Sandra Szurek, ‘Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility: 
Force Majeure’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility 
(OUP 2010) 475, at 476; S Malcolm Evans, International Law (5th edn, OUP 2018) at 437. 
7 On this occasion, the relationship between force majeure and other defences under the law of state responsibility 
(e.g. necessity) or exceptions in the law of treaties (e.g. supervening impossibility to perform) is not explored. 
See, however, Paddeu (n 6) at 467; Christina Binder, ‘Does the Difference Make a Difference? A Comparison 
between the Mechanisms of the Law of Treaties and of State Responsibility as Means to Derogate from Treaty 
Obligations in Cases of Subsequent Changes of Circumstances’, in Marcel Szabo (ed), State Responsibility and 
the Law of Treaties (Eleven, The Hague 2010) at 27–31. 
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these include the content of relevant primary obligations and a force majeure clause as an 
exception in international investment contracts.  
Since in the past force majeure was often invoked to cover any situation of inability to 
perform due to armed conflict, this has created a misunderstanding about what the concept 
actually means and how it differs from other concepts that carry the same name and perform a 
similar role, but on a distinct plane. As will be demonstrated in the article, this conceptual 
confusion and the lack of clarity still pervades contemporary jurisprudence and scholarship. In 
view of the recent surge in investment claims following ‘Arab Spring’ events in 2011 and other 
ongoing armed conflicts in the region, which seem to portend the renaissance of the force 
majeure invocation in investment disputes,8 the examination of this question is timely and 
pertinent. 
The article distinguishes in particular between three concepts of force majeure: 1) force 
majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, 2) force majeure as a factual circumstance 
informing the duty of due diligence and 3) force majeure as an exception in investment 
contracts. While all three concepts can be used as a state’s shield against claims of foreign 
investors, they operate on different levels and overlapping legal contexts, and may exhibit 
similar characteristics with different meanings. Through surveying the relevant investment 
jurisprudence and doctrinal views, the article juxtaposes these concepts, discusses 
commonalities and differences, and attempts to untangle conceptual complexities. It argues 
that while the potential of force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness may be 
limited, its manifestation as an aspect that modifies the obligation of due diligence or an 
exception included in investment contracts, has played an important role as a defence against 
investment claims for conflict-related losses. 
 Force majeure has attracted very limited attention in international law scholarship9 and 
barely any in investment law.10 This contribution presents the first examination of the defence 
                                                          
8 See e.g. Ampal-America Israel Corp v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICC Case 18215/GZ/MHM (Final award, 
December 2015) (Ampal, ICC); Ampal-America Israel Corp v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No 
ARB/12/11 (Decision on Liability, February 2017) (Ampal, ICSID); Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation 
Limited v. the Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Ministry of Oil and Minerals, ICC Arbitration No. 19299/MCP 
(Award, 10 July 2015). In recent Libya cases, not yet published, force majeure has been also reportedly invoked 
as a defence. See L Peterson, ‘As Libya Begins to See Wave of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, at Least Seven 
Turkish BIT Claims are Pursued at ICC’ (IAReporter, 31 March 2017) <https://www.iareporter.com/articles/as-
libya-begins-to-see-wave-of-investment-treaty-arbitrations-at-least-seven-turkish-bit-claims-at-icc/> accessed 7 
December 2018. 
9 For a general discussion on force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, see Paddeu (n 6); 
Szurek (n 6). 
10 See Bjorklund (n 6); Anastasios Gourgourinis ‘Financial Crisis as Force Majeure under International Law and 
EU Law: Defending Emergency Measures, à l’européenne, in Investment Arbitration under Intra-EU BITs’ in 
Christian Tams et al (eds), International Investment law and Global Financial Architecture (Elgar 2017) 281. 
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in the context of investment claims emerging from armed conflict, and more generally, the first 
comparative analysis of different force majeure conceptions. Significantly, the article 
introduces a novel concept of force majeure as a factual circumstance informing the duty of 
due diligence, which helps explain the relationship between force majeure as a legal defence 
and a state’s obligation to protect foreign investors. Although the discussion is limited to the 
cases of investment losses in conflict situations, the findings are of a general nature and equally 
relevant for application of force majeure in a non-investment setting as well as situations when 
a supervening event is not armed conflict. 
The article starts with a brief description of force majeure as a defence in the law of 
state responsibility. It differentiates between its invocation in situations when investment losses 
resulted from state action and situations when losses derived from state omission. With regard 
to the latter, the article examines whether force majeure can be invoked to justify the non-
payment of financial obligations in time of armed conflict. Section Three looks into the 
application of force majeure in cases of alleged non-performance of the obligation of 
protection. The focus of this part is the relationship between the duty of due diligence and force 
majeure, something that has generated a great deal of jurisprudential and doctrinal confusion. 
Lastly, Section Four examines the application of force majeure clauses in investment contracts, 
which have been commonly invoked in time of turmoil. It highlights the often overlooked 
differences between the private law exception and the defence in international law, while also 
identifies points of convergence, focusing in particular on two requirements: unforeseeability 
and impossibility.  
 
2. FORCE MAJEURE AS A CIRCUMSTANCE PRECLUDING 
WRONGFULNESS 
 
In the international law of state responsibility, force majeure presents one of the circumstances 
that precludes the wrongfulness of a state’s conduct. In other words, it is one of the 
circumstances that exonerates a state from responsibility for not performing a particular 
international obligation. As such, force majeure constitutes a defence against a claim of state 
responsibility and could potentially be used as a host state’s defence against claims of foreign 
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investors for the alleged breach of investment treaty obligations.11 Force majeure is codified 
in Article 23 of ARS, which provides: 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international 
obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the 
occurrence of an irresistible force or an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the 
State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. 
 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: 
a. the situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with other
 factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; 
  b. the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring. 
 
For the defence to be successfully invoked, three conditions, in particular, must be met. 
First, the event of force majeure must be due to either an irresistible force or an unforeseen 
event. With respect to ‘irresistibility’, the International Law Commission (ILC) explained in 
the Commentary to ARS ‘that there must be a constraint which the state was unable to avoid 
or oppose by its own means’.12 On the other hand, the alternative condition of 
‘unforeseeability’ means that ‘the event must have been neither foreseen nor of an easily 
foreseeable kind’.13 It suffices that either the event is unforeseeable or foreseeable but 
irresistible.14 Due to its ambiguous meaning, the requirement of ‘unforeseeability’ is analysed 
in greater detail in Section 4.1. 
Second, the force majeure act must be beyond the control of the state. This does not 
mean that it must be absolutely external to the state invoking the defence. As stated in the 
comprehensive UN Secretariat Study, force majeure can be applied even in cases when the 
activities or omissions giving rise to it stem from the state itself, as long as they are not 
attributed to it as a result of its wilful behaviour.15 This requirement is related to the negative 
condition stipulated in ARS Article 23(2)(a) that the situation of force majeure must not be 
                                                          
11 General law of state responsibility can apply in a specialised regime, like investment treaty law, with respect 
to the matters that are not regulated in the specialised regime. See Article 55 of ARS. 
12 ILC Commentary to ARS, Article 23, para 2. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Study by the Secretariat, ‘“Force majeure” and “Fortuitous event” as Circumstances Precluding 
Wrongfulness: Survey of State Practice, International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine’, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1978, Vol II, UN Doc A/CN.4/315 (Part 1) 61, at 70 (Secretariat Study).  
15 Ibid, at 69. See also Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company v Republic of Burundi (1994) 96 ILR 279, at 
318, para 55, cited in ILC Commentary to ARS, Article 23, para 9 (in which the tribunal rejected force majeure 
because the impossibility was a consequence of the decision of the Government of Burundi and not the result of 
‘an external event beyond’ its control).  
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‘due to’ the conduct of the state invoking the defence. The phrasing of the ‘non-attributability’ 
requirement was discussed in the final reading of the draft Article.16 According to Special 
Rapporteur Crawford, the threshold of the ‘contribution’ to the situation of impossibility, 
contained in the earlier draft Article 31, was too restrictive.17 If that threshold had been kept, a 
force majeure defence could have been excluded in circumstances during which the state has 
‘unwittingly contributed to a force majeure situation by something which, in hindsight, might 
have been done differently but which did not itself constitute a breach of an international 
obligation or make the event any less unforeseen’.18 This would have certain implications, 
particularly when the event giving rise to force majeure was due to human action (e.g. riots), 
meaning that unpopular government measures could be construed as said government’s 
‘contribution’.19 The threshold was thus changed to ‘due to’, which enables a force majeure 
defence even when the state has ‘unwittingly contributed to the occurrence’ of the situation, 
but precludes it when the state’s role in its occurrence was consequential.20 
Lastly, the unforeseeable, irresistible and uncontrollable event must make it materially 
impossible for a state to perform the obligation. The condition of ‘material impossibility’ 
signifies that merely the increased difficulty of performance is insufficient for a successful 
invocation of the plea. The Commentary to ARS emphasises that ‘[f]orce majeure does not 
include circumstances in which performance of an obligation has become more difficult, for 
example due to some political or economic crisis’.21 What exactly this means has been subject 
to disagreement. The arbitral tribunal in Rainbow Warrior Affair famously equated material 
impossibility with ‘absolute impossibility’.22 This view was later criticised by James 
                                                          
16 James Crawford, ‘Second Report on State Responsibility’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1999, Vol II(1), UN Doc A/CN.4/498/Add.1–4, 3, at 66 (Second Report). 
17 Draft Article 31(2) read: ‘Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence 
of the situation of material impossibility.’ 
18 Crawford, Second Report. 
19  For example, in Autopista case, force majeure was invoked due to massive protests following the unpopular 
measures taken in compliance with the investment contract by the Venezuelan Government. The tribunal noted 
that although the Venezuelan Government was not responsible for the protests, the latter were supported by the 
State Government. The tribunal emphasised that the successful plea of force majeure would not have been possible 
had it been proved that the support of the State Government was causal for the protests or their seriousness. 
Autopista Concesionada v Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/00/5 (Award, 23 September 2003) para 
128. 
20 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, Vol I, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1999, at 282, para 
56. 
21 ILC Commentary to ARS, Article 23, para 3. 
22 See e.g. Rainbow Warrior Affair (New Zealand v France) (1990) 20 RIAA 217, 253. The tribunal found that 
‘the test of applicability of [draft article 31] is of absolute and material impossibility’ and consequently rejected 
France’s defence by emphasising that ‘a circumstance rendering performance more difficult or burdensome does 
not constitute a case of force majeure.’ 
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Crawford23 and implicitly rejected by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Case,24 both maintaining the distinction between ‘material impossibility’ under 
force majeure and the stricter standard of ‘absolute impossibility’ under the rule of supervening 
impossibility to perform, as codified in Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties.25 Given its unsettled status under international law, the applicability of the 
impossibility standard in the context of conflict situations is further discussed in the subsequent 
sections.26  
It has been long undisputed that the event giving rise to force majeure could be a natural 
disaster (e.g. an earthquake) as well as a man-made situation, such as war, revolution or mob 
violence. In fact, it was due to the latter type of events that force majeure entered prominently 
onto the international legal plane. Historically, the defence was frequently raised against claims 
of foreign investors for losses they suffered in conflict situations. Countries in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries often declared international and civil wars, as well as other types 
of internal strife, as force majeure in an attempt to preclude all claims for reparations by aliens 
and their home states.27 While it was widely accepted that force majeure was a universal rule 
of international law (e.g. it was referred to as a general principle of law in the Hague 
Conference for the Codification of International Law in 1930),28 the disagreement existed as 
to what it actually meant.29 The violent events of that era thus presented an opportunity for 
statesmen, adjudicators and scholars to assert and establish their views about the content and 
role of force majeure in international law. 
States have invoked force majeure to justify their non-performance of an international 
obligation ‘to do’ something (positive obligation) as well as an obligation ‘not to do’ or refrain 
from doing something (negative obligation). The following sections consider how the defence 
has been applied with respect to both types of obligation in the context of conflict-related cases 
concerning foreign investors. 
                                                          
23 Crawford, Second Report, para 257–59.  
24 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 1, para 
102. 
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (signed on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331. 
26 See Section 2.2 and, in particular, Section 4.2.  
27 Secretariat Study, at 106–24. See also Section 3. 
28 Ibid, at 68, 83. 
29 See e.g. the statement of Mexico on the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Treaties in 1968: ‘Force 
Majeure was a well-defined notion in law; the principle that “no person is required to do the impossible” was 
both a universal rule of international law and a question of common sense.’ On the other hand, representatives 
of other countries voiced concerns that ‘force majeure lacked precision’ (the US), and ‘had not been clearly 
defined and had no precise meaning in international law’ (the Soviet Union). Cited in Secretariat Study, at 88. 
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2.1  Non-Performance of an International Obligation Resulting from Action 
 
The cases where force majeure was invoked for non-performance resulting from action (i.e. 
breach of an international obligation consisting in a duty of a state to refrain from acting) have 
been rare, which is not that surprising as force majeure presupposes an element of 
‘involuntariness’. In other words, for the defence to be successfully invoked, the external 
circumstances would have to make it impossible to avoid committing an act in violation of 
international law. A commonly cited example is a pilot who loses control over their aircraft 
due to weather conditions and thus knowingly but involuntarily violates the airspace of another 
state.30 In the context of investment law, property losses that investors sustained as a 
consequence of destruction by state organs in the midst of hostilities could potentially present 
a case for a force majeure defence. However, if a state action was deliberate and taken in pursuit 
of protecting national security interests or to prevent grave and imminent danger, as it often is, 
other legal justifications will be more appropriate, in particular security exceptions and 
‘necessity of the situation’ exceptions in advanced armed conflict clauses, if included in 
investment treaties,31 or a necessity defence as codified in ARS Article 25.32  
The confusion between these types of situations is illustrated in AAPL v Sri Lanka, a 
case concerning the destruction of the investor’s farm in the course of the military operation 
that government forces undertook against the Tamil Tigers.33 The AAPL tribunal concluded 
that Sri Lankan authorities failed to take precautionary measures before launching an armed 
                                                          
30 Roberto Ago, ‘Eighth Report on State Responsibility’, ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1979, Vol II, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1979.1 (Part 1), 3 (Eighth Report) at 48, 52, citing correspondence 
between the US and Yugoslav Government, following episodes of US aircraft entering the airspace of 
Yugoslavia in 1946. Such situations would have to be distinguished from those where ‘it [was] impossible for 
the author of the conduct attributable to the State to realize that its conduct is not in conformity with the 
international obligation’, which were described by Ago as fortuitous events (e.g. the pilot who enters the aerial 
space of another state without noticing it due to weather conditions). See 1569th Meeting, ILC, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1979, Vol I, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979, at 185. The distinction between 
force majeure and fortuitous events was later abandoned by the ILC. See Crawford, Second Report, para 253. 
31 For an example of a security exception, see Article IX of the US–Ukraine BIT (1994).  For an example of an 
exception entailed in advanced armed conflict clauses, see Article 5(2) of the UK–Ukraine BIT (1993). 
32 In its first paragraph, ARS Article 25 states: 
 Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in 
conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: 
  (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a   
  grave and imminent peril; and 
   (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States    
  towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a   
  whole. 
33 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3 (Award, 21 June 
1990). 
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attack on the investor’s premises. The dissenting arbitrator, Samuel Asante, held that the 
tribunal’s assessment of governmental measures was inappropriate and that the obligation of 
protection was precluded because the government was ‘confronted with essentially a force 
majeure situation’.34 Asante’s view appears inaccurate because the alleged breach arose out of 
a situation that included the state’s volition (a carefully planned armed attack) and was thus 
within the state’s control and a result of the state’s voluntary conduct. The event could have 
given rise to another defence, however, namely that of necessity.  
When the conflict situation passes the threshold of international or internal armed 
conflict required for application of international humanitarian law,35 exceptions to state 
responsibility which exist in primary rules of a specialised regime governing the conduct of 
states in armed conflict remove the need for general defences under the law of state 
responsibility.36 Thus historically, destruction of alien property in the course of armed conflict, 
battles or during bombardment has often been categorised as the ‘legitimate act of war’,37 or 
measures ‘compelled by the imperious necessity of war’,38 thus not giving rise to state 
responsibility. The damages resulting from the seizure or destruction prompted by imperious 
military necessity were considered to be ‘war losses’, i.e. damages incident to combat action, 
and as such, no compensation could be demanded.39 In such situations, force majeure (or other 
general defences like necessity) does not need to be considered beyond the degree to which it 
may fit into the unavoidable military necessity exception provided for in international 
humanitarian law.40 
                                                          
34 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion, at 593. 
35 See e.g. the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case which 
has been widely relied upon as authoritative with regard to the meaning of armed conflict in both international 
and non-international conflicts. According to the tribunal, an armed conflict exists whenever ‘there is resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State (...).’ Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY-IT-94-1-T (Decision on 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995) para 70. 
36 ILC Commentary to ARS, Article 25, para 21; CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/08 (Award, 12 May 2005) para 353. 
37 See The Dunn Case (Chile/United Kingdom) (1895), cited in Secretariat Study, at 158; The Case of the 
Compagnie Francaise Des Chemins De Fer Venezueliens (France/Venezuela) (1905), cited in Secretariat Study, 
at 166. 
38 See The Bembelista Case (Netherlands/Venezuela) (1903), cited in Secretariat Study, at 163. 
39 For more cases see John  Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United 
States Has Been a Party (Government Printing Office, Washington 1898) at 3668, 3670, 3678, 3703, 3679; 
Jackson Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (Government Printing Office 1904) at 14–25, 35–36; Edwin 
Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (Banks Law Publishing 1915) at 256–57.  
40 See e.g. Article 23(g) of the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 
18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) 187 Consol T S 227. See also Georg Dahm, Volkerrecht 
(Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1961) vol. Ill, 213–14; cited in Secretariat Study, at 220. 
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Cases involving genuine military operations and consequences of measures that a state 
takes during war should be distinguished from those due to the general situation of war itself. 
The distinction was highlighted in the Agache Case emerging from World War II, where the 
French/Italian Conciliation Commission explained in its decision that the fact that transported 
goods were ‘spoiled and reduced in value [as] a result of the general disruption caused by the 
war in rail transport between Italy and France’ and not a result of a measure that state took 
during the war.41 Furthermore, it was also held by post-conflict arbitral tribunals that the state 
was not responsible for the interruption of ordinary commercial and professional activities and 
the consequential loss of business and profit, or claims for damages because they were ‘an 
inevitable result of a state of war’.42 While such situations were referred to as force majeure, 
de jure, the non-responsibility of a state was due to lack of causality and consequently lack of 
attribution. The damage could not be attributed to the state, as it was caused by a general 
situation of war rather than a state’s direct action or omission.  
The next section turns to discussing the invocation of force majeure as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness emerging from the state inaction. 
 
2.2  Non-Performance of an International Obligation Resulting from Inaction 
 
Non-performance due to a force majeure event has been more commonly invoked with respect 
to an obligation to do something. One could differentiate between at least three types of such 
an obligation: first, obligations originating in a contract that a state has entered into with an 
investor (e.g. failure or delay in delivering the goods or services); second, an obligation of 
prevention (e.g. failure to protect investors from physical violence); and third, a financial 
obligation to pay (e.g. failure to make certain payments to an investor). As will be argued 
below, in the first two categories, force majeure arguably takes a different legal form than a 
defence under the law of state responsibility, thus they will be addressed under separate 
headings. The third category of financial impossibility, however, is one where international 
courts and arbitral tribunals have most expressly addressed force majeure in the past, and also 
one that has been subjected to much controversy. It thus warrants a further analysis.  
Countries are often faced with economic challenges to make payments during and in 
the aftermath of protracted armed conflicts when their budget is impoverished and their 
                                                          
41 The Establishment Agache Case (France/Italy) (1955), cited in Secretariat Study, at 187. 
42 See e.g. Heny Case (US v Venezuela) (1903) 9 RIAA 113, at 125.  
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resources are needed for defence or the post-conflict rebuilding of the economy. While in 
theory such economic impossibility could give rise to force majeure, commentators have 
widely agreed this is unlikely, as it only constitutes an increased difficulty of performance.43 
The historical arbitrations seem to reflect a different view. Several tribunals in the past held 
that force majeure can exculpate the state from the responsibility to pay its financial obligation 
on the ground that its resources are depleted due to the intense conflict situation. For example, 
in the case of French Company of Venezuelan Railroads, the Venezuelan government argued 
that the revolution constituted force majeure and thus rendered it impossible to repay its debt 
to the French investor.44 The umpire clarified that the force majeure defence under international 
law was applicable and that the situation of internal armed conflict necessitated the 
consumption of all the government’s resources in the same fashion as it deprived the company 
of the proceeds of its ordinary business.45 The umpire emphasised the importance of prioritising 
the country’s existence in allocating the government’s financial resources: ‘[Its] first duty was 
to itself. Its own preservation was paramount. Its revenues were properly devoted to that end. 
The appeal of the company for funds came to an empty treasury, or to one only adequate 
demands of the war budget.’46 
Similar reasoning, but with different outcome, was espoused by the arbitral tribunal 
constituted under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Russian Indemnity case,47 and by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Serbian and Brazilian Loans cases48 
and the Socobelge case.49 In the latter case, Greece argued that the severe political and 
economic crisis in the post-conflict period made it impossible to pay in full and immediately 
the amount owed to the foreign investor in accordance with the arbitral award.50 The Court 
held that the financial circumstances of the state alone could not be the reason for not 
performing a res judicata award, however, ‘the debtor’s capacity to pay’ could be taken into 
account when making arrangements in relation to the execution of the award.51  
                                                          
43 Paddeu (n 6) at 459; Szurek (n 6) at 479–80; Bjorklund (n 6) at 501; ILC Commentary to ARS, Article 23, para 
3.  
44 1888 French Company of Venezuelan Railroads (1904) 10 RIAA 285, at 335, 327. 
45 Ibid, at 314. 
46 Ibid, at 354. 
47 Russian Claim for Interest on Indemnities (Russia v Turkey) (1912) 11 RIAA 421, 434. 
48 Serbian Loans (France v Serb-Croat-Slovene) [1929] PCIJ Ser A No 20, para 82; Brazilian Loans (Brazil v 
France) [1929] PCIJ Ser A No 21, para 66. 
49 Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Socobelge) [1939] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 78, at 161. 
50 Counter-Memorial of Greece PCIJ Rep Series C No 91, at 100. 
51 Socobelge (n 49) at 167. The Court did not have to decide on the arguments concerning force majeure because 
Belgium discontinued the claim concerning Greece’s responsibility for the failure to perform the award.  
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In contrast to early twentieth century defence strategies, modern examples of states 
pleading incapacity to fulfil financial obligations indicate the preference for a necessity defence 
as codified in Article 25 of ARS, or more specific investment treaty security exceptions. This 
is illustrated by a series of arbitration cases prompted by the Argentine financial crisis in the 
early 2000s.52 According to Paddeu, the shift from force majeure to necessity was only 
ostensible, as defences in early twentieth century cases had in fact used the necessity defence 
elements in ‘force majeure’ clothing.53 The reason for this was the uncertainty as to whether 
necessity would be recognised as a defence in international law, which led lawyers to address 
the situations of necessity under the more accepted and familiar defence of force majeure.54 
This view would imply that with the codification of necessity in ARS, the situations of non-
payment of financial obligations are better addressed under necessity than force majeure.  
Some objections can be raised against this conclusion, though. First, in the above-
mentioned historical cases, the ‘necessity’ element that states could not meet their financial 
obligation without putting at risk their preservation was used only as a subsidiary argument. 
The primary reason for raising force majeure was that state finances had been decimated by 
war, and consequently the servicing of debt was materially impossible.55 Inability to perform 
rather than protection of state vital interests was at the core of the defence.  
Second, in the Argentine cases, the financial inability to pay was due to a financial 
crisis, and the prospect of a conflict was only invoked by the state to describe a threat which 
could have materialised had the contested economic measures not been passed.56 In contrast, 
in the early twentieth century cases, the conflict was something that had actually caused the 
financial inability of the state to service debts. This highlights an important difference between 
the force majeure and necessity defences, namely the timing of the event that triggers the 
respective defence. While force majeure impossibility stems from an irresistible force or 
unforeseen event which is ongoing or occurred in the past, the plea of necessity, as defined in 
ARS Article 25, is based on the ‘peril’ to the state’s essential interest—a risk that has not yet 
                                                          
52 Argentina resorted to the necessity defence to justify its economic measures which were passed to avoid a 
‘serious threat to its existence, its political and economic survival, to the possibility of maintaining its essential 
services in operation, and to the preservation of its internal peace.’ See LG&E Energy Corp v The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 (Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006) para 257. See also CMS, Award (n 
36); Enron Corp v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/03 (Award, 22 May 2007); Sempra Energy 
International v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (Award, 28 September 2007); Continental 
Casualty Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9A (Award, 5 September 2008). 
53 Paddeu (n 6) at 443.  
54 Ibid, at 445. 
55 See French Company of Venezuelan Railroads (n 44) at 327. 
56 See e.g. LG&E (n 52) para 257; Continental Casualty (n 52) para 180–81. 
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materialised but is ‘existent’, ‘grave’ and ‘imminent’.57 Therefore, there is a difference between 
cases where a situation of armed conflict has resulted in financial impossibility to fulfil an 
obligation and cases where the non-fulfilment of a financial obligation was justified with an 
aim to prevent a perilous event from occurring (e.g. an outbreak of violence which could lead 
to the destruction of the state). While the former situations can be addressed by invoking force 
majeure, the latter fall within the realm of the state of necessity.  
This distinction is important as it rebuts the argument that the plea of force majeure 
cannot be invoked to justify the non-compliance with financial obligations. The essence of that 
argument is that the ability to carry out financial obligation is never absolute—it may only be 
impaired for a certain duration and amounts merely to an increased difficulty of performance, 
which is not enough for a successful invocation of force majeure.58 While it is true that in 
practice, situations when a country’s finances are stretched to the extent that this would present 
material impossibility to perform financial obligations are very rare, the possibility nonetheless 
exists, especially during and in the aftermath of prolonged and intense conflicts. More 
convincing is thus the view offered by Special Rapporteur Ago that force majeure impossibility 
could prevent states from paying financial obligations, and that such impossibility was 
temporary.59 The state is thus excused from the obligation to pay only for the duration of the 
situation giving rise to force majeure.60 The continued failure to pay in the period after the 
force majeure circumstances had ceased would give rise to state responsibility.61  
The Iran–US Claims Tribunal has confirmed the practice of allowing temporary 
suspension of financial responsibilities on the ground of force majeure in some conflict-related 
cases.62 For example, in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc., it was held that revolutionary events 
in Iran in 1978 and 1979 caused the disruptions of the banking operations and amounted to a 
force majeure situation. Consequently, the respondents’ failure to pay debts due during that 
period was excused by force majeure.63 Furthermore, recent practice related to situations of 
                                                          
57 See Paddeu (n 6) at 463; see Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (n 24) para 54.  
58 ILC Commentary to ARS, Article 23, para 3. 
59 Ago, Eighth Report, at 59. 
60 The temporal scope of application of force majeure would need to be determined with a case-by-case analysis 
of factual circumstances, rather than by relying on the formal beginning and the end of armed conflict. See e.g. 
Anaconda-Iran Inc v Iran et al (1986) 13 Iran–US CTR 199, at 213. 
61 ARS Article 27(a) states that the duty to perform treaty obligations is revived once the circumstances giving 
rise to the preclusion of wrongfulness no longer exist. 
62 See e.g. Anaconda-Iran (n 60); Gould Marketing, Inc v Iran et al (1983) 3 Iran–US CTR 147, at 153; General 
Dynamics Telephone Sys Ctr v Iran (1985) 9 Iran–US CTR 153, at 160; General Electric Co. v Iran et al (1991) 
26 Iran–US CTR 148, at 180; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v Iran et al (1997) 33 Iran–US CTR 60, at 78. 
63 Sylvania Technical Systems v Iran (1985) 8 Iran–US CTR 309–10. 
15 
 
economic crisis suggests more favourable attitudes of states to plead financial incapacity under 
the force majeure head.64 
When armed conflict has ceased, however, force majeure defence will be of limited 
assistance to a state. This does not mean that a state’s capacity to pay in the transitional period 
will be completely ignored in consideration of its liability. There is a compelling argument 
presented elsewhere, and supported by the post-conflict judicial, arbitral and diplomatic 
practice, that a state’s inhibited ability to pay would be reflected in modification of the amount 
and the time of payment of compensation and damages on the basis of equity.65 
Force majeure was also commonly invoked when states were accused of violating 
another type of positive obligation, namely the obligation to protect foreign investors against 
violent action at the hands of non-state actors. As will be argued below, though, the rule 
applying to obligations of protection differs from the circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
and thus warrants introducing a new concept of force majeure, analysed in the next section. 
 
3. FORCE MAJEURE AS A CIRCUMSTANCE INFORMING THE DUTY OF 
DUE DILIGENCE 
 
The arbitral jurisprudence emerging from the conflict situations of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was instrumental to the development of rules on protection of aliens and 
alien property. Broadly speaking, two schools of thought emerged with regard to state liability 
for injuries to aliens sustained in conflict. According to one theory that never gained much 
support in practice, the state was always responsible for such losses.66 The other school took 
the opposite view by asserting absolute non-responsibility for conflict-related injuries. Latin 
American scholars and diplomats most prominently advanced this view, unsurprisingly so, as 
                                                          
64 Iceland relied on force majeure defence to justify its non-compliance of international obligations due to 
economic crisis. See Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland (Icesave) [2013] EFTA Ct Rep 4. 
For the analysis of the case and, more broadly, a discussion on the invocation of force majeure in financial 
crises, see Gourgourinis (n 10). 
65 For a detailed discussion, see Jure Zrilič, ‘International Investment Law in the Context of Jus Post Bellum: 
Are Investment Treaties Likely to Facilitate or Hinder the Transition to Peace?’, Journal of World Investment 
and Trade, 2015, 16: 604–632. 
66 See e.g. P Fauchille, Droits Et Devoirs En Cas D’insurrection (1900) 18 Annuaire de l’IDI 234; E Brusa, 
Responsabilité des Etats á raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers en cas d’émeute ou de guerre civile 
(1898) 17 Annuaire de l’IDI 96, at 108–09; C Wiesse, Reglas de Derecho Internacional Aplicables a las 
Guerras Civiles (1893), cited in Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (New York 
University Press 1928) at 140.   
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it was Latin American countries that were usually at the receiving end of claims to compensate 
aliens for losses that they suffered in civil strife.67  
The theory of non-responsibility was important as it introduced force majeure to the 
discourse about state responsibility. As summarised by Argentine jurist Calvo, if aliens 
suffered injuries as a result of the host state’s unlawful measures during conflict situations, the 
state could still escape responsibility by invoking the defence of force majeure.68 Accordingly, 
a state was not liable for losses sustained by aliens at the hands of rebels and revolutionaries 
because the revolutions constituted a force majeure event.  
This view was espoused by prominent Latin American statesmen and was manifested 
in their diplomatic correspondence, treaties and even their constitutions and municipal laws.69 
For example, in 1903, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister defended the government’s stance that 
a state was not responsible for such conflict-related losses because they ‘like those of natural 
origins, cannot be prevented or avoided …’.70 This argument has been repeatedly voiced 
against claims for compensation that Western powers brought against Venezuela in the 
aftermath of various conflicts in the nineteenth century. For example, the Venezuelan 
government rejected the responsibility for acts of insurgents during guerrilla action in 1858 by 
arguing that injuries sustained by foreigners in such internal disturbances ‘are disasters for 
which Governments cannot humanely be held responsible, just as they are not answerable for 
fires, plagues, earthquakes or other disorders arising from physical causes.’71 Similar views 
were advanced in the aftermath of revolutions and insurrection in Brazil in 1884 and 1993,72 
and insurrection in Cuba in 1887.73  
 
 
 
                                                          
67 Harmodio Arias, ‘The Non-liability of States for Damages Suffered by Foreigners in the Course of a Riot, an 
Insurrection or a Civil War’, American Journal of International Law, 1913, 7(4): 724–766; Carlos Calvo, Le 
droit international théorique et pratique, vol 3 (3rd edn, Pedone-Lauriel 1880). 
68 Calvo, ibid, at 429. On these developments, see also Paddeu (n 6) at 412. 
69 For example, the Guatemalan Constitution of 1875 provided in Article 46 that ‘neither Guatemalans nor 
foreigners shall have indemnification for damages arising out of injuries done to their persons or property by 
revolutionists.’ Generally, see Julius Goebel, ‘The International Responsibility of States for Injuries Sustained 
by Aliens on Account of Mob Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars’, American Journal of International Law, 
1914, 8: 802–52, at 833. 
70 Secretariat Study, quoting M. T. Pulido Santana, La Diplomatica en Venezuela, vol 1 (Caracas, Imprenta 
Universitaria, 1963) at 131. 
71 Ibid, at 110. 
72 Goebel (n 69) at 847–48. 
73 Secretariat Study, at 116. 
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3.1  The Emergence of the Due Diligence Rule 
 
Despite strong diplomatic opposition coming from Latin America, in most cases where 
conflict-related claims were addressed before arbitrations or mixed-claims commissions, the 
view that force majeure presents an automatic exception for responsibility for injuries incurred 
on aliens was adamantly rejected. The theory on absolute non-responsibility was considered 
unfairly prejudicial to aliens and their property, and thus a more nuanced view evolved—one 
which acknowledged that despite the general non-responsibility of a state for injuries to 
foreigners in times of conflict, in exceptional cases the state could still be held responsible. It 
became widely accepted that the state was only liable if it had failed to exercise due diligence 
in protecting aliens. In other words, the existence of the host state’s responsibility was to be 
determined by establishing whether the state had exercised proper care in the prevention of 
injuries to aliens.74  
Most arbitral tribunals and mixed commissions followed this rule.75 For example in the 
case of Spanish Zone of Morocco,76 the arbitrator Max Huber held that the state was not in 
itself responsible for the mere fact there was a conflict, whether a riot, rebellion, civil war or 
international war; nor was it responsible for the fact that those events gave rise to damage in 
its territory.77 While Huber accepted that such events must be treated as ‘cases of force 
majeure’, he held that a state could nevertheless be responsible for what the authorities do or 
not do to avert, to the extent possible, the consequence’ of such events.78 To establish 
responsibility, the conduct of the state’s authorities or armed forces during the conflict had to 
be analysed. Huber held that the state was not liable for damages incurred at the hands of the 
hostile tribes so long as the rebellion caused an inability to protect foreign property.79 The 
situation, however, changed when this ‘abnormal situation’ arising from the conflict ended and 
the state was again ‘able to exercise its authority in more or less normal conditions’.80 Huber 
                                                          
74 See P Fiore, Nouveau droit international public, vol I (2nd edn, Pedone-Lauriel 1886) 582, cited in 
Sambiaggio Case (Italy v Venezuela) (1903) 10 RIAA 499, at 511.  
75 See e.g. Sambiaggio, ibid; Kummerow, Otto Redler and Co, Fulda, Fischbach, and Friedericy Cases 
(Germany v Venezuela) (1903) 10 RIAA 369, at 394; Home Missionary Society (US v Great Britain) (1920) 4 
RIAA 42, at 44; Youmans (US v Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 110; Chapman (US v Mexico) (1930) 4 RIAA 632. 
76 Spanish Zone of Morocco (Great Britain v Spain) (1924) 2 RIAA 615, at 639, 642. The case concerned more 
than fifty claims made by British nationals against Spain for the losses they suffered during the riots and civil 
uprising that took place in the wake of the insurrection of a Berber tribe in the early 1920s. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, at 653–54. 
80 Ibid, at 421. 
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understood due diligence as a standard that took into account the specific circumstances of the 
situation in which the harm was done and the resources available to the state.81  
It has become widely accepted that the obligation to act with due diligence in pursuit 
of the protection of foreigners is one of the elements of the international minimum standard of 
treatment which constituted customary international law.82 In the context of conflict situations, 
the obligation required the state to exercise due diligence to protect foreign nationals from 
physical violence. In ascertaining the content of due diligence, commissions and tribunals 
typically highlighted the following factors: the type of conflict situation, the degree of the 
state’s control over parts of its territory, the state’s resources and the foreseeability of the 
harm.83 In the same way, the principle of due diligence has been applied in contemporary 
investment treaty jurisprudence.84 
 
3.2  Force Majeure as a Legal Concept vs Force Majeure as a Factual Circumstance 
 
While the case law emerging from violent situations at the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century was of great importance for clarifying the obligations that 
states owe to foreign investors in time of armed conflict, it also created a great deal of confusion 
about the role of force majeure in determining state responsibility. Because the notion of force 
majeure was commonly invoked in those cases, they were referred to and analysed in the ILC 
reports and commentaries during the process of codification of articles on state responsibility. 
The conflict-related jurisprudence was used to support and inform the codification of force 
majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. These historical developments led some 
scholars to introduce a distinction between two approaches to conceptualising force majeure.85  
According to an event-based approach, force majeure was largely understood as a 
concept describing a certain type of event, including armed conflicts, the occurrence of which 
                                                          
81 Ibid, at 644.  
82 See e.g. Elihu Root, ‘Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad’, American Journal of International 
Law, 1910, 4: 517–28, at 521–22; Borchard (n 39) at 28; Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State 
Responsibility Part I (Clarendon Press 1983) at 159–79. 
83 See e.g. Chapman (n 75) at 639; Spanish Zone of Morocco (n 76) at 644–45; Sambiaggio (n 74); GL Solis (US 
v Mexico) (1928) 4 RIAA 358, at 362; Mena Case (Spain v Venezuela) (1903) 10 RIAA 748, at 749. 
84 See e.g. AAPL (n 33) para 85B; American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc v Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No 
ARB/93/1 (Award, 21 February 1997) paras 6.05–6.06, 6.11, 6.14; Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4 (Award, 8 December 2000) para 84; Pantechniki SA Contractors & Engineers 
v The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No ARB/07/21 (Award, 30 July 2009) para 77; Joseph Houben v 
Burundi, ICSID Case No ARB/13/7 (Award, 12 January 2016) para 161; Peter Allard v Barbados, PCA Case 
No 2012-06 (Award, 27 June 2016) paras 543–44. 
85 Paddeu (n 6) at 438. 
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was enough for the state to escape responsibility for any acts or omissions related to that event. 
In other words, the mere occurrence of a conflict sufficed to preclude the wrongfulness of the 
state’s action and no subsequent scrutiny of a state’s measure was needed.86 Because this 
understanding of force majeure forewent the assessment of the impact that the critical event 
had had on the state’s ability to perform its obligation under international law and that opened 
the door to abuse, a new, so-called situation-based approach was introduced.87 According to 
this, each individual claim had to be analysed to determine whether the event was really beyond 
the state’s control, and whether all the elements of force majeure were met. Drawing on the 
case law of mixed claims commissions and arbitrations mentioned above, scholars concluded 
that the situation-based approach prevailed.88  
There is no doubt that a mere outbreak of armed conflict (or the occurrence of any other 
physical or natural event) per se does not justify invocation of force majeure as circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness, and that certain conditions which make the performance of an 
obligation impossible must be present (unforeseeability, irresistibility, uncontrollability). 
Despite differences in the views of the role and meaning of these features, this has been 
relatively uncontested in international law.89 Introducing the distinction between event- and 
situation-based concepts of force majeure thus seems superfluous. More problematically, it is 
based on the inaccurate analysis of the conflict-related jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Whether or not states were responsible for losses that aliens suffered 
was not decided through the evaluation of conditions of force majeure defence, but rather 
through the assessment of the duty of due diligence. In other words, those cases were not 
decided on the ground of force majeure, as often suggested,90 and therefore are not directly 
relevant for the content of a force majeure defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
A more relevant distinction would seem to be one between force majeure as a legal 
justification in the law of state responsibility (i.e. a circumstance precluding wrongfulness) and 
force majeure as an event, a factual circumstance or a situation in the context of which the host 
state adopts or fails to adopt certain conduct. While revolutions, insurrections and civil wars 
                                                          
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Paddeu (n 6) at 438.  
89 See Secretariat Study, at 70, citing P. Reuter, Droit International public (4th edn, Paris, Presses universitaires 
de France, coll. Themis 1973) 181: ‘In order to exonerate a State from its responsibility, force majeure must 
possess the three characteristics states in all legal systems: it must be irresistible, it must be unforeseeable, and it 
must be external to the party invoking it.’ 
90 See e.g. Paddeu (n 6); Szurek (n 6) at 477; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International 
Law (7th edn, OUP) at 564; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2012) at 183. 
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were often described as situations of force majeure in arbitral decisions,91 legally, those cases 
were not decided by analysing specific force majeure conditions, but rather by assessing 
whether governments exercised due diligence in protecting aliens. The fact that the due 
diligence obligation accommodates a broad array of circumstances, including a state’s ability 
to protect, a state’s control over its territory, and unforeseeability of a conflict situation, further 
amplified terminological confusion with the force majeure as a legal concept.  
This distinction gives rise to an important question as to what is the relationship 
between the due diligence obligation and force majeure as a legal defence in international law. 
Can a force majeure defence be effectively invoked in cases of non-performance of obligations 
that involve the duty of due diligence? There are important conceptual and methodological 
differences between these two concepts of international law. Due diligence is part of some 
primary rules of international law: in the context of investment law, it is a yardstick for 
measuring the fulfilment of an obligation to protect investors that exists in customary 
international law as a minimum treatment standard, and in most investment treaties as a ‘full 
protection and security’ provision.92 In contrast, force majeure is a secondary rule that 
exonerates state responsibility for the breach of a primary rule of international law. It can be 
only invoked when the state has committed a wrongful act, i.e. violated an international 
obligation. If there is no wrongfulness, there is no need to resort to the defences under the law 
of state responsibility.93 The most important practical consequence of this difference lies in the 
obligation to pay compensation. Following the successful invocation of force majeure under 
ARS, the wrongfulness of the state’s act is precluded, however, the state could still be obliged 
to pay compensation.94 By contrast, establishing that the state carried out its due diligence duty 
within the relevant primary rule gives rise to no such obligation. 
In theory, force majeure can be invoked with respect to any international obligation. 
However, this does not mean that the content of primary obligations cannot affect the 
applicability of the force majeure defence. The Secretariat Study on force majeure thus noted 
that the application of force majeure can be excluded by the content of the specific international 
                                                          
91 Spanish Zone of Morocco (n 76).  
92 For an example of a full protection and security clause see Article 4 of the Germany–Mali BIT (1977). 
93 On the distinction between primary and secondary rules, see ILC Commentary to ARS, Chapter V, paras 2–4, 
7; CMS, Decision on Annulment, 25 September 2007 (n 36) para 129, 132–34. 
94 See ARS, Article 27(b); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case (n 24) para 48. The question is not settled in 
international law, however, and tribunals have espoused conflicting positions, see e.g. CMS, Award (n 36) paras 
383–94 (noting that the duty to compensate continues regardless of the invocation of the necessity); LG&E (n 
52) para 264 (noting that the risk of damages shifts to the investor). See also Martins Paparinskis, 
‘Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in International Investment Law’, ICSID Review, 2016, 31(2): 484–
503, at 500.  
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obligation.95 As argued in Section 2, some special regimes of international law provide for their 
own force majeure exception or similar limitations as part of the primary rules,96 which 
effectively prevents the operation of force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
It is submitted that the same applies for the obligations containing a rule of due diligence. It is 
difficult to imagine a situation where the wrongfulness of a state’s failure to sufficiently protect 
an investor during armed conflict would be precluded by the force majeure defence pursuant 
to ARS Article 23. Namely, whether the state has violated this obligation will be measured 
against the duty of due diligence, taking into account different circumstances which may 
largely coincide with the conditions of a force majeure defence. As explained above, arbitral 
tribunals often held that the state was unable to protect aliens because the situation in question 
was sudden (and thus unforeseeable),97 intensely violent (and thus irresistible),98 or it occurred 
in the part of the territory which is outside of the state’s control (and thus uncontrollable).99 If 
no breach of the obligation to protect is found, there is also no need for invoking force 
majeure—the elements of latter are already implicitly incorporated in the due diligence rule.100 
While a force majeure defence is possible in principle, its invocation in such situations 
would be incompatible with the purpose of investment law obligations of prevention. Both, 
force majeure and the due diligence rule, are tools that international law uses for allocating 
risks concerning states’ failure to comply with primary international obligations. These risks 
are defined by certain characteristics such as unforeseeability, impossibility and 
uncontrollability. Since the application of the due diligence rule in the context of armed conflict 
already reduces the risk for a state’s responsibility, the application of force majeure as a 
secondary tool for allocating the same risk in the same circumstances and against the same 
parameters, is gratuitous. The reverse position (i.e. the use of force majeure before the breach 
of the obligation to protect has been ascertained through the due diligence analysis) would not 
only be legally inaccurate but could also result in a decision that a state has to pay compensation 
for the losses that investors sustained during armed conflict. Therefore, it is proposed that 
                                                          
95 Secretariat Study, at 220. 
96 For example, the military necessity exception in the law of armed conflict, see Section 2.1. See also Article 18 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides for an exception concerning the right 
to stop and anchor during passage in foreign waters due to force majeure.   
97 See e.g. US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran Case (US v Iran) (Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, at 33; 
Ampal, ICSID (n 8) paras 285, 289. 
98 See e.g. Spanish Zone of Morocco (n 76) at 644–45; GL Solis (n 83) at 362; Pantechniki (n 84) para 82. 
99 See e.g. Wipperman Case, reported in Moore (n 39) at 3041; Spanish Zone of Morocco (n 76); Ampal, ICSID 
(n 8) paras 285, 289. 
100 For similar views, see Eagleton (n 66) at 156. See also Secretariat Study, at 215, 217. 
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flexibility of the due diligence rule excludes the application of force majeure for certain 
primary obligations, in particular the obligation to protect.  
 The relationship between due diligence and force majeure was most directly addressed 
by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal in Gould Marketing case, in which the tribunal stated:  
By force majeure, we mean social and economic forces beyond the power of the state 
to control through the exercise of due diligence. Injuries caused by the operation at such 
forces are therefore not attributable to the state for the purposes of its responding for 
damages.101 
 
The tribunal conceptualised the relationship between due diligence and force majeure as one 
of thresholds, whereby a higher threshold of ‘uncontrolabillity’ applied for force majeure. 
Accordingly, if an event is within the power of a state to control it, but a state fails to do so, the 
responsibility will be determined by using the due diligence rule. On the other hand, if the event 
is outside of the power of the state to control it (i.e. the event could not be controlled even by 
exercising due diligence), force majeure defence would come into play. This position is 
untenable, namely even in the latter case of the higher degree of ‘uncontrollability’, the due 
diligence rule already excludes the responsibility of a state for injury, hence no recourse to 
force majeure is needed. 
More recently, the investment tribunal in Ampal-American Israel Corp v Egypt 
implicitly acknowledged the overlap in conditions of due diligence rule and the defence of 
force majeure.102 In that case, the American investor, whose primary activity was to export gas 
from Egypt to Israel, claimed, among others, that the government of Egypt failed to protect its 
facilities and the pipeline system from continuous terror attacks during the 2011 revolution. 
While the government argued that those attacks constituted force majeure, the investment 
tribunal rejected that ground of defence. The tribunal noted that the contractual dispute between 
the same parties involving the same facts was already decided in 2015 in an international 
commercial arbitration administered by the International Court of Arbitration within the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).103 While the investment tribunal decided to rely 
on the factual findings that the ICC tribunal made in its award with respect to the attack on the 
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pipeline as res judicata, it did not treat similarly the ICC tribunal’s legal findings with respect 
to force majeure defence.104  
Having found that it was bound to apply the investment treaty standards rather than the 
standards under the investment contract, such as force majeure invoked by the state, the 
investment tribunal decided the case by relying on the duty of due diligence as entailed in the 
full protection and security provision of the US–Egypt BIT.105 In other words, the tribunal 
treated the duty of due diligence as a standard that can replace force majeure, and it proceeded 
to focus its analysis on whether the state had fulfilled its international obligation rather than 
whether it should be excused for having breached that obligation. Ultimately, both ICC and 
ICSID tribunals found that Egypt failed to protect the investor, relying on the same factual 
analysis but arriving at the outcome by applying different legal standards. While force majeure 
in question was a contractual clause rather than a defence under international law, the tribunal’s 
reasoning clearly indicated how factual circumstances justifying force majeure as a legal 
concept overlap with the circumstances of the duty of due diligence, and that the latter can be 
applied to legal problems emerging from factually identical situations.  
The Ampal case is also illustrative of states’ preference to rely on force majeure 
exceptions stipulated in investment contracts rather than the defence in international law for a 
certain category of claims. Despite carrying the same name, there are important differences 
between these two concepts, which are addressed in the next section.  
 
4. FORCE MAJEURE AS AN EXCUSE TO NON-PERFORMANCE IN 
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS  
 
Force majeure as a defence in international law of state responsibility and codified in Article 
23 of ARS must be distinguished from force majeure clauses, often contained in investment 
contracts governed by domestic and international commercial law. In recent years, such force 
majeure clauses have been invoked more frequently than force majeure in international law to 
excuse the non-performance due to a conflict situation. Breaches of investment contracts can 
be brought to investor-state arbitration because they explicitly provide so, the contractual 
breach is elevated to the violation of the investment treaty by means of an umbrella clause or 
the contractual breaches are so fundamental that they constitute a violation of an investment 
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treaty standard (in particular indirect expropriation or fair and equitable treatment). While some 
investment tribunals were reluctant to apply standards from investment contracts,106 most 
considered them to the extent this was necessary for the determination of whether investment 
treaty provisions had been breached.107 
While tribunals typically treat force majeure clauses as self-contained provisions in the 
context of a contract in which the clause is contained, they sometimes aid interpretation by 
relying on applicable law, which could be domestic law,108 international commercial law109 
and sometimes even public international law.110 While both types of force majeure provide for 
a defence in situations when normal performance of an obligation is disrupted due to a 
supervening event, the conditions of the defence and its legal effects can differ. It is thus 
important to understand the differences between international and contractual force majeure, 
especially because the two defences often get conflated and misinterpreted in doctrine and 
jurisprudence.111  
Unlike international law force majeure, which precludes wrongfulness of a state’s 
failure to carry out an international obligation (rooted either in custom or a treaty), contractual 
force majeure can be typically invoked by either of the parties for the performances of a 
contractual obligation. It does not provide a defence to state responsibility only, but rather 
serves as a device for allocating risk in contractual transactions between equal parties. 
Moreover, parties can customise the contract and tailor the force majeure exception to their 
own needs, which can affect the scope, the conditions and the legal effect of the defence.112 
With regard to the scope, contractual force majeure clauses typically include a list of 
events that can trigger the application of a clause. By such detailed drafting parties customise 
the clause to the circumstances of their contract and business transaction, and maximise the 
protection against potential political and other risks. Although such lists are usually non-
exhaustive, it is often perceived among investors that the defence will not be available if the 
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risk is not specifically identified in the clause.113 Consequently, the force majeure events are 
often broadly defined, extending the scope of force majeure situations for which the defence is 
typically invoked in public international law.114 According to the ICC model force majeure 
clause, which reflects the prevailing practice and emerging consensus on force majeure defence 
in international business transactions,115 the events of force majeure include armed conflict or 
a threat thereof, hostile attack, military embargo, blockade, all types of internal conflicts (from 
civil wars, insurrections and riots to mob violence), act of terrorism, and even general labour 
disturbance such as strikes and occupations of factories and premises.116 
The wider scope of a contractual force majeure clause can be explained by different 
nature of a breached obligation and the identity of a party invoking the defence. Even small-
scale violence can prevent investors from executing their obligation under a contract, while the 
same cannot be said for the failure to carry out an international obligation by a state. 
Justifications for non-performance of international obligations tend to be narrowly defined in 
order to foster stability in international relations. Moreover, states, unlike investors, possess 
certain resources that place them in a better position to manage risks arising out of exceptional 
circumstances. Thus the event, which is beyond the control of an investor, is not necessarily 
beyond the control of a state.  
For example, an occupation of an investor’s premises by its employees in the course of 
strikes or mob violence has been a common ground for investment treaty claims on the ground 
that the state failed to provide sufficient protection to investors.117 Such confined violent 
interference typically does not meet the conditions of force majeure in international law. On 
the other hand, the same type of event can be sufficiently beyond the control of investors, 
enabling them to invoke contractual force majeure for the non-performance of their obligation 
stipulated in investment contracts. This makes the scope of situations for which the force 
                                                          
113 In Kell Kim Corp v Cert. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E. 2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) the Court noted that ‘ordinarily, only 
if the force majeure clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents a party’s performance will that 
party be excused.’ See also Mark Augenblick and Alison B Rousseau, ‘Force Majeure in Tumultuous Times: 
Impracticability as the New Impossibility’, Journal of World Investment and Trade, 2012, 13 (noting that 
‘unless the type of event is specifically listed in the force majeure clause, virtually no external event will be 
deemed unforeseeable and constitute force majeure excusing contract performance.’). 
114 For example, in Nykomb Synergetics, the contractual force majeure clause, invoked by the foreign investor, 
included ‘amendments to legislative regulations’ and ‘government resolutions’. See Nykomb Synergetics 
Technology Holding AB v Latvia, SCC (Award, 16 December 2003) para 3.6.4.  
115 ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003 - Hardship Clause 2003, ICC Publication 650 (2003). 
116 Ibid, s 3. 
117 See e.g. Wena Hotels (n 84); Noble Ventures Inc v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11 (Award, 12 
October 2005); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/00/2 (Award, 29 May 2003). 
26 
 
majeure presents a viable defence mechanism narrower in international law than in the context 
of investment contracts.  
Furthermore, the fact that states exercise more control over political and social 
situations, which can escalate into a conflict, raises important questions about the content of 
the conditions of force majeure. The conflict-related arbitral decisions signal a lack of clarity 
as to what the meaning of these conditions is in international law and under contractual clauses, 
whether conditions are the same for either type of defence and whether they differ depending 
on the party invoking the defence. The following sections thus turn to unpacking the criteria 
that have proven most problematic and have yielded inconsistent interpretation in practice, 
namely unforeseeability and impossibility. 
 
4.1  Unforeseeability 
 
While it is generally accepted that an event must be unforeseeable in order to qualify as force 
majeure, the question arises as to how strict is this requirement. The ICSID tribunal in 
Autopista v Venezuela set the bar high for ‘foreseeability’. In that case, the foreign investor 
initiated arbitration because of Venezuela’s failure to comply with the concession agreement 
in which Venezuela had committed to carry out works and maintenance of the highway system, 
including raising the tolls for the use of the highway. The government’s intention to implement 
toll increases resulted in violent protests and riots in Caracas in 1997 and 2002, which led the 
government to dispense with the tolls altogether.  
In the arbitration, Venezuela defended its failure to perform its contractual obligation 
by invoking force majeure and arguing that in view of the violent reaction and civil unrest, it 
had been impossible for it to further increase the tolls. More specifically, it argued that the 1997 
unrest was unforeseeable because ‘the parties could not and did not foresee a protest of such 
magnitude and threatened violence that it would undermine the entire financing mechanism for 
the construction project …’.118 While Venezuela acknowledged that the prospect of public 
opposition to its unpopular measure was indeed foreseeable, it contested the foreseeability of 
the magnitude and form of such resistance. Because the concession agreement did not contain 
the relevant force majeure clause, the tribunal resorted to the law governing the contract which 
was Venezuelan law, inasmuch as it does not conflict with international law.119 In its 
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interpretation of force majeure, the tribunal held that the standard in Venezuelan administrative 
law does not differ from the one imposed in public international law.120  
The tribunal was not convinced by Venezuela’s defence. In the reasoning behind its 
decision, it emphasised that in 1989 Venezuela had experienced similar riots leading to 
hundreds of deaths in response to an increase in gasoline prices. According to the tribunal, the 
impact of that civil unrest on Venezuelan society, which had happened eight years earlier, 
proved that the 1997 riots could have been foreseen at the time of the negotiation of the 
concession agreement.121 On the ground that the protests had been foreseeable, the tribunal 
dismissed the plea of force majeure. According to the tribunal’s interpretation, for the event to 
be foreseeable, it does not have to be probable or likely to occur—it is enough that it could not 
be ruled out as a possibility. The fact that Venezuela anticipated some public disagreement 
over the toll increase showed the tribunal that the possibility of a ‘very violent protest’ could 
not have been excluded. Furthermore, the tribunal used the country’s previous record of 
conflict as the ultimate yardstick for the foreseeability considered in this case. Although it had 
been almost a decade since the last similar upheaval, that event led the tribunal to conclude 
there was a lack of unforeseeability in the matter at hand.  
This conclusion is problematic for several reasons. First, it offers no tangible criteria to 
delimit foreseeability: practically speaking, everything is foreseeable. Second, it does not allow 
states to prioritise regarding their protective policies. If everything is foreseeable and states 
ought to be proactive regarding any possible harmful event, then they will never be able to 
concentrate on those risks that are indeed foreseeable. Third, it renders force majeure defence 
practically useless to every state that has previously experienced protests and riots.  
In another ICSID case, RSM Production Corporation v Central African Republic,122 
the arbitral tribunal took the opposite approach to determining foreseeability. RSM and the 
Central African Republic entered into a contract according to which the foreign investor 
obtained a four-year licence for oil exploration. During the last year of exploration in 2001, 
due to civil and political turmoil and armed conflict in the Central African Republic, the 
investor invoked a force majeure clause to justify the non-performance of certain aspects of 
the contract. Although the force majeure in this case was based on the contract,123 the elements 
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that the tribunal inspected were the same as those under international law.124 Even though the 
country was politically unstable and outbreaks of violence had not been uncommon, the 
tribunal held that the conflict situation in question was not foreseeable.  
The tribunal espoused a more nuanced approach than the Autopista tribunal in its 
analysis, focusing on the general political and security atmosphere at the time, and the type and 
magnitude of the past unrest. It held that the occurrence of the latter could not have portended 
the occurrence of a security situation that would have made the performance of the contract 
impossible, and thus the plea of force majeure was successful.125 In contrast to the Autopista 
tribunal, the RSM tribunal did not focus on the past record of violence on the country’s territory, 
but rather discussed the condition of ‘foreseeability’ in relation to other conditions, in particular 
its impact on the performance of the obligation.  
In a recent ICC case, Gujarat v Republic of Yemen, the threshold of unforeseeability 
was further lowered.126 In that case the investor terminated the production sharing agreements 
on the ground that the force majeure events in Yemen in 2011 (riots and insurrection) made it 
unsafe for its staff to carry out the data seismic studies and other activities required under the 
investment contract. The tribunal relied exclusively on the wording of the broadly drafted force 
majeure clause and found no need to aid interpretation by relying on Yemeni domestic law, 
which governed the contract.127 Since the clause did not include the condition of 
‘unforeseeability’, the tribunal concluded that riots and insurrection did not need to be 
unforeseeable for the force majeure clause to apply.128  
While this indicates the importance of clear and precise drafting of force majeure 
clauses, tribunal’s obiter dictum is more interesting for the present analysis. Namely, the 
tribunal went on and suggested that it would have reached the same conclusion even if the 
clause had expressly provided for an ‘unforeseeability’ requirement.129 It rejected the view that 
the force majeure event is foreseeable if similar events existed before or at the time of entering 
into a contract. What was crucial, according to the tribunal, was not the existence of the force 
majeure risk at the time of contracting, but rather whether there was a ‘significant and sharp 
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increase in risk beyond what was contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting.’130 In 
other words, the ‘unforseeability’ condition would be met even when the country experienced 
a security crisis before or at the time contracting, if the situation would suddenly and severely 
deteriorated.  
This flexible interpretation of unforeseeability, while more understanding of 
commercial realities, is in stark contrast to the Autopista tribunal’s strict interpretation. The 
notable difference between the Gujarat and RSM decisions, on the one hand, and Autopista, on 
the other hand, is that in the former cases the investors invoked force majeure defence, while 
in the latter, it was the government. This invites the question whether the unforeseeability 
should be measured differently, depending on whether the party invoking force majeure 
defence is a state or an investor.  
Whether the event is foreseeable is determined by the knowledge of the event or the 
anticipation thereof. Thus, it would appear to be more apposite to consider foreseeability as a 
subjective element—whether or not a particular event is unforeseeable depends on the 
circumstances of a subject invoking the force majeure defence. For example, a war that has 
been declared by a state or precipitated by its direct actions, is clearly more foreseeable for a 
state than for a foreign investor. On the other hand, some events arising from an investor’s 
sphere of control, like strikes, could be anticipated even by investors that exercise some control 
over their employees and a company’s financial conditions. The ability to foresee detrimental 
events depends on the availability of resources and access to relevant information. When it 
comes to security crises and conflict situations, it is reasonable to assume that a state has more 
control over pertinent information about such risks and the likelihood of them materialising in 
the near future than private actors. The threshold of foreseeability will thus likely be set higher 
for a state than for a foreign investor, regardless of whether force majeure is invoked as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness or a contractual defence.  
This, however, does not mean that a threshold is so high as to make the defence 
impossible. For the successful invocation of force majeure, the foreseeability should not only 
concern occurrence of the prejudicial event, but also its determinative characteristics that affect 
the non-performance of the obligation, namely its scope, magnitude, intensity, form, frequency 
and timing. In other words, the standard of foreseeability is fragmented and thus the element 
of exactness is required. Foreseeing a possibility of a conflict in the future would not preclude 
the force majeure defence, if the conflict preventing the state from carrying out an obligation 
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was of unforeseeable scope and magnitude. This was the approach confirmed by the RSM and 
Gujarat tribunals which, in contrast to the Autopista tribunal, did not base their assessment 
solely on the history of violence and the general political situation in a state at the time of 
contracting, but also on what has happened since, and how severely and at what pace has the 
security situation deteriorated.  
 
4.2  Impossibility 
 
While contractual force majeure clauses usually do not expressly address the standard of 
impossibility, the practice suggests that the threshold of impossibility created by the 
supervening event, which is required for the successful invocation of the force majeure 
defence, is lower than in international law. As explained above, the Commentary to ARS makes 
it clear that an increased difficulty of performance does not constitute force majeure under 
international law. The standard that has been codified is one of material impossibility, which, 
as sometimes argued, purports to ‘convey an objective rather than a subjective criterion for 
determining the situation of impossibility’.131 In stark contrast, the ICC model force majeure 
clause, for example, states that force majeure is invoked when the performance of contractual 
obligations is impeded, rather than made impossible.132 As emphasised by the ICC, the ‘test of 
commercial reasonableness’ should be used when assessing the criterion,133 which arguably 
lowers the bar from the standard of ‘impossibility’ to the level of commercial 
‘impracticability’.134 The ICC standard force majeure clause purports to replace the application 
of the relevant domestic law provisions on force majeure, which differ across jurisdictions and 
may impose a stricter standard that may be deemed inappropriate for international commercial 
transactions. 
The trend towards the more lenient standard of ‘impracticability’ is further reflected in 
codifications of international commercial rules and customs. For example, CISG codifies force 
majeure in Article 79 as ‘impediment beyond [party’s] control’.135 Because the rationale of the 
CISG is to harmonise international commercial law and bridge the divide between civil and 
common law doctrines, the language of the provision is vague and sufficiently broad to 
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accommodate not only situations of absolute impossibility but also cases of increased difficulty 
of performance. A similar approach is followed in the UNIDROIT Rules.136 Some scholars 
argued that these developments are reflective of an autonomous standard that emerged from 
the practice of international merchants and forms part of the new lex mercatoria.137  
Conflict-related arbitral practice reflects this shift towards the lenient interpretation of 
impossibility for contractual force majeure, but also illustrates confusion and lack of clarity as 
to whether the same standard applies in international law. In the Autopista case, the tribunal 
made several errors in the treatment of the ‘impossibility’ requirement. First, while the tribunal 
made clear from the outset that the potential inconsistencies between the Venezuelan rules on 
force majeure and international law will be resolved with the latter prevailing over the 
former,138 it did not follow through when interpreting the standard of impossibility. When 
considering whether the 1997 unrest met the requirement of impossibility, the tribunal 
concluded that the standard was the same under Venezuelan and international law: ‘[u]nder 
this standard, it is not necessary that the force majeure event be irresistible; it suffices that by 
all reasonable judgment the event impedes the normal performance of the contract.’139 The 
tribunal rejected the claim that force majeure under international law imposes a standard of 
absolute impossibility and supported its argument by referencing Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.140 This is in particular puzzling because the Articles explicitly mention criteria 
of irresistibility and material impossibility.  
Second, the tribunal held that the finding that the riots were not unforeseeable meant 
that investigation of other criteria was not necessary anymore and force majeure claim failed 
on that ground alone. According to international law, however, force majeure applies even in 
situations when the event was foreseeable but impossible to avoid due to its strength (i.e. was 
irresistible). Moreover, unforeseeability is only relevant inasmuch as it makes it materially 
impossible for the state to perform an international obligation. Thus, the condition of 
impossibility is a vital element of force majeure defence in international law and needs to be 
met cumulatively with other conditions. The tribunal’s dismissal of further analysis is in 
particular problematic because it hinted that the impossibility requirement in that case was 
                                                          
136 UNIDROIT Rules, Article 7.1.7. 
137 Mazzacano (n 2) at 54; David R Rivkin, ‘Lex Mercatoria and Force Mejeure’ in Emmanuel Gaillard (ed), 
Transnational Rules in International Commercial Arbitration (ICC Publications 1993) at 208. 
138 Autopista (n 19) para 104. 
139 Ibid, para 121. 
140 Ibid, para 123 
32 
 
actually likely met.141 This means that had the tribunal applied the law accurately, the final 
decision would have been completely different as the state’s defence would have succeeded. 
The likely reason for the Autopista tribunal’s reticence to discuss impossibility was that 
it wanted to avoid reaching the conclusion on whether the government could have done 
something to prevent or resist the riots while complying with its obligation (increasing the road 
tolls). The question can give rise to tension between the state’s duty to use force to quash 
political protests and internal strife, on the one hand, and the appropriateness of such violent 
measures, on the other hand. Without giving a final answer, the tribunal voiced the predicament 
in the following terms: 
Venezuela admits that the civil protest was not irresistible in the sense that it could not 
have been mastered by the use of force. This being so, the question then becomes: by 
all reasonable judgment how much force can a State be legally required to deploy to 
perform its contract obligations? The answer to this implies a delicate assessment that 
calls in part for political judgment.142 
 
In the Gujarat case, the tribunal held that the contractual force majeure did not entail 
the ‘impossibility’ requirement because it did not expressly provide for it. While the respondent 
(the Government of Yemen) argued that such requirement existed by means of application of 
Yemeni law that governed the contract, the tribunal treated the clause as a self-contained 
regime, reflecting the will of the parties and being sufficiently clear and precise to avoid any 
interpretative exercise.143 As with the condition of unforeseeability discussed above, however, 
the tribunal went on and reaffirmed that its decision would not have been different had the 
impossibility condition been introduced to the clause, because ‘“impossibility” in the context 
of force majeure meant that it was not possible to perform an obligation in a practical way.’144 
In other words, impossibility in the context of investment contracts denoted commercial 
impracticability rather than absolute impossibility. Citing the decision in National Oil 
Corporation v Sun Oil Company, the tribunal noted there was a trend to define force majeure 
in long-term international contracts less strictly than under domestic contracts.145 
In the cited National Oil Corporation case, however, the ICC tribunal actually adopted 
a more cautious approach when considering the impossibility requirement. The tribunal held 
                                                          
141 Ibid, para 124. 
142 Ibid, para 124. 
143 Gujarat (n 8) para 153. 
144 Ibid, para 160. 
145 Ibid, para 152. 
33 
 
that the ban on US citizens (respondent’s personnel tasked to carry out an oil exploration 
agreement in Libya) to travel to Libya did not sufficiently impede the performance of the 
contract as to justify the force majeure plea.146 According to the tribunal, the respondent could 
have hired non-US staff to carry out the contract. While the tribunal rejected the force majeure 
defence, its assessment of the standard of impossibility hinged on the reasonable balancing of 
potential alternatives. The required standard of impossibility was short of absolute, but it also 
rose above mere commercial impracticability.  
A requirement that the party asserting force majeure defence would have to 
demonstrate there was no reasonable alternative arrangement that would have allowed the 
performance under the contract, was highlighted in some other conflict-related cases.147 For 
example, in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v Societe Generale de L’Industrie du 
Papier,148 the respondent’s personnel were required to leave the country following the outbreak 
of armed conflict. After the end of the conflict, the respondent rejected the claimant’s request 
to continue performing its contractual duties, arguing that it was not possible to ensure the safe 
return of its employees to the country. The tribunal allowed force majeure defence only for the 
duration of the conflict (one month). It, however, held that the impossibility standard was not 
met for the period after the conflict, as there were other staffing alternatives the respondent had 
not explored.  
These cases show that the plea of force majeure has been considered on a spectrum of 
impossibilities, ranging from absolute impossibility in international law to increased difficulty 
in the context of international commercial contracts, with a varying degree of ‘reasonable’ 
impossibility in between. Could the latter test be of any assistance in interpreting force majeure 
in international law? While it has been made clear that material impossibility in international 
law force majeure does not denote increased difficulty, in practice it will also rarely amount to 
complete inability, in particular when the supervening event is armed conflict. To effectively 
deal with violence, a government will often have other options than violating obligations owed 
to foreign investors. The question then arises what are the costs of such alternatives, measured 
not necessarily in monetary but, more importantly, in security and humanitarian terms. For 
example, in Autopista case, the state could have met its obligation of increasing road tolls 
pursuant to the investment contract by deploying more military force to suppress the violent 
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opposition. While the impossibility was not absolute, the alternative solution would arguably 
create unreasonable and excessive costs reflected in an exacerbated security situation and a 
likely increase in death toll. In that context, the impossibility criterion was indeed met, as 
indicated, but regrettably not confirmed, in the final award. 
Such an interpretation of material impossibility under international law force majeure 
introduces a degree of flexibility by taking into account not only circumstances created by a 
conflict situation, but also the nature and importance of the international obligation in question 
(e.g. a commercial obligation from an investment contract would lend itself to a more lenient 
interpretation of impossibility), and by assessing whether there were any reasonable 
alternatives to a breach of the said obligation. This gives rise to a modified objective standard; 
one that is situated between absolute impossibility (an objective standard) and increased 
difficulty or impracticability (a subjective standard). While this understanding of force majeure 
has been often followed when investors invoked the defence, there seem to be no convincing 
reasons not to extend it to the invocation of international law force majeure in factually similar 
situations. Indeed, Special Rapporteur Ago described material impossibility as ‘relative 
impossibility’, the threshold of which was met when the performance would result in a 
‘sacrifice that could not be reasonably required.’149 While reasonableness is a vague term and 
its content will have to be ascertained in each individual case, it arguably provides a state with 
desirable leeway to make legally difficult and often politically sensitive decisions in turbulent 
times.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Historically, force majeure has been commonly invoked in diplomatic correspondence, 
jurisprudence and doctrinal works dealing with state responsibility for losses that aliens 
sustained in various types of turmoil. This has created a misplaced expectation about the 
                                                          
149 Ago, Eighth Report, paras 103, 106. See also 1569th Meeting, ILC (n 29) at 185, para 5 (noting that there is 
no real freedom of choice, if one of the alternatives could not be reasonably required to be followed). A similar 
interpretation of impossibility has been supported under the EU law, where the European Court of Justice has 
permitted the defence in situations when performance would be possible by making unreasonable and excessive 
sacrifice. See Case 11-70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, para 23; Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel v Köster and Berodt & Co [1970] ECR 1161, para 38; Case C-325/96, Fábrica de Queijo Eru 
Portuguesa Ldª v Subdirector-Geral das Alfândegas, and Ministério Público [1997] ECR 7249, para 24. For 
more on the application of force majeure in EU law see Michael Parker, ‘Force Majeure in EU Law’ in Ewan 
McKendrick (ed), Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract (Routledge 2014) at 341; Gourgourinis (n 10) at 
296–304. 
35 
 
potential of this international law principle as a defence against claims of foreign investors for 
conflict-related losses. This article has argued that the usefulness of the defence is limited; 
however, not because of the high threshold of the criteria for its successful invocation, but 
rather because of other defences incorporated in international law, investment treaties or private 
law instruments.  
It has been shown that the content, scope and origin of a primary obligation will play 
an important role in the application of force majeure. If the violation is due to actions of state 
organs, defences that purport to cover state voluntary measures will take precedence (e.g. 
exceptions in investment treaties, necessity). If a state has breached a positive obligation, the 
scope for the application of the defence will open up. Departing from most of the doctrine, the 
article has argued that force majeure could be used to temporarily justify the state’s failure to 
make financial payments during armed conflict. 
It has been further argued that with respect to the obligation of prevention (e.g. the 
obligation to protect as encompassed in customary law and full protection and security 
provisions of investment treaties), the force majeure defence loses its appeal. This article has 
dismissed the doctrinally popular distinction between force majeure as a situation—and event-
based defence as outdated—and instead introduced a distinction between force majeure as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness and force majeure as a circumstance modifying the 
obligation of due diligence. It has been demonstrated that the latter has played an essential role 
in deciding most of historical conflict-related investment cases. Legally, however, those cases 
were decided on the ground of the duty of due diligence which already incorporates the 
elements of force majeure. This removes the need to invoke force majeure defence in cases 
where the performance of the allegedly violated obligation is assessed on the basis of due 
diligence.  
Lastly, the article has considered the exception of force majeure as stipulated in 
investment contracts, thereby highlighting important differences with the defence in 
international law. Such force majeure clauses are often tailored to the needs of parties entering 
into long-term commercial transactions and are consequently drafted in broad terms, thereby 
widening the scope of situations in which they can be applied, and lowering the impossibility 
threshold to the level of commercial impracticability. This could create a problem when the 
content of force majeure concept in international commercial law is read into the force majeure 
principle in the international law of state responsibility. While being mindful of the differences 
between these two concepts, the article has been nonetheless critical of an overly strict 
interpretation of the force majeure requirements in international law, in particular 
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unforeseeability and impossibility. It has been argued that whether these criteria are met must 
be assessed against the circumstances of a case, in particular the circumstances on the side of 
the obligor and the characteristics of armed conflict in question (unforeseeability), and the 
nature of the breached obligation and the availability of reasonable alternatives (impossibility).  
  
